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ABSTRACT 
This article confirms that labor productivity in the European economies has continued to slow 
down in recent years. U.S. productivity growth has been higher than in the EU, but only since 
2001. At the same time, both economies have modified previous employment performance: 
EU employment growth is now higher than in U.S. This article proposes that productivity 
growth be explained by demand dynamics, and investment in particular, not forgetting the 
influence of employment, along with other factors such as new technologies. 
  
JEL: E20, O43, O51, O52. 
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* This article is part of the investigation project “Growth in the European economies, labor markets and offshor-
ing processes,” financed by the Complutense University and Santander Bank (PR41/06-14955) during the years 
2007 and 2008. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Among the many works published on productivity, one frequently recurring assumption 
is that labor efficiency has grown faster in the United States than in Europe since the mid-
1990s. This notion has been embraced by most economists and politicians on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Better performance by the U.S. is essentially related to new information and com-
munication technologies (ICT), as well as institutional factors. In fact, the term “Eurosclero-
sis” is used in characterizing European performance as compared to U.S., leading to various 
proposals on the need for Europe to follow the U.S. example, such as the Lisbon Strategy, 
adopted by the European Council in March 2000, and subsequent revisions made under the 
auspices of the European Commission (the Sapir Report, 2003) and the European Council (the 
Kok Report, 2004). 
This diagnosis and prescribed therapy, encouraging both the increase of new technolo-
gies and the liberalization of markets, respond to a supply-led growth approach that is charac-
teristic of the neoclassical theory. Within this theoretical framework, productivity growth is 
split between variations in capital intensity (capital–labor ratio), expressing an accumulation 
dynamic, and the total productivity of factors, expressing the overall efficiency generated by 
technical progress. As in these analysis long-term capital intensity in a static state is consid-
ered constant, the majority of these works highlights that technical progress is the engine of 
modern growth. The role of technical progress is further oversimplified as it is virtually 
equated with advances in new information and communication technologies (ICT) as well as 
in the institutional framework. The diffusion of ICT and more flexible institutions improve 
the overall efficiency of the economy because they reduce both production and transaction 
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costs. In particular, the absence of labor market regulation favours the generation, competition 
and mobility of employment, raising not only productivity but employment1.  
This article shows that empirical evidence does not confirm the assumption that the U.S. 
productivity dynamic is superior to Europe’s. Labor productivity in the European economies 
has continued to slow down since the mid-1990s, but U.S. productivity growth has been high-
er than in the EU only since 2001. Besides, American productivity growth, though slightly 
higher than European, has not been especially intense. Finally, the data reveal that both econ-
omies have modified previous employment performance: EU employment growth is now 
higher than in U.S.  
This article interprets these processes based on two central arguments: that demand dy-
namic, and investment in particular, structurally conditions productivity performance and, in 
turn, that this performance depends also on the extent to which employment accompanies 
economic growth. This approach does not deny that new technologies and labor market condi-
tions are linked to productivity development, but through mechanisms more complex than 
those proposed by supply theories.  
From this perspective, the diminishing productivity growth in the European economies 
must be understood in a scenario of weakening of aggregate demand. It is in this context that 
EU labor productivity growth rates have been declining, especially since the 1990s. At the 
same time the European economies dramatically increased their ability to create jobs, which 
also helps to explain the slow down in productivity growth. In parallel, U.S productivity has 
grown clearly faster than that of Europe (2001-07) only when this economy has shown little 
job creation. Such changes in the relationship between the growth rates of employment and 
                                                 
1 Wolff (1997) includes an extensive selection of works by the main authors analysing productivity from a neo-
classical perspective, such as Solow, Denison, Griliches, Abramovitz, Jorgenson, Baumol, and others. A critique 
approach to the neoclassical growth theory is developed by Palazuelos and Fernandez (2009). 
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productivity call into question the explanations used by the mainstream to interpret growth in 
both areas.  
Finally, the empirical evidence reveals that ICT investments have been significantly 
higher in the U.S. than in Europe. However, the relationship between ITC and productivity 
growth is not linear, because such technologies are incorporated into productive activities 
through ICT investment, but their influence on productivity is mediated through conditions of 
employment and asymmetries between sectors and branches. If demand and employment pol-
icies are highly focused toward labor intense service sectors, productivity growth can not be 
much faster, especially when demand dynamic is weak.   
This article is divided into five sections. The first presents the most important facts 
around productivity and employment growth, both in U.S and EU, between 1994 and 2007. 
The second develops a theoretical proposal for explaining productivity growth based on the 
aggregate demand dynamics and the evidence of a trade-off effect between productivity and 
employment. The next two sections explain how labor markets and new technologies are 
linked to productivity’s pace of growth. The final section summarizes our main conclusions. 
 
2. FUNDAMENTAL FACTS: GROWTH RATES AND LEVELS OF LABOR PRO-
DUCTIVITY 
Labor productivity is measured as the GDP per hour worked. For our purposes, the Eu-
ropean countries are those fifteen that formed the EU before its 2004 enlargement. The refer-
ence period is 1994-2007, the initial benchmark being 1994 because at that point the Euro-
pean economies had already emerged from the recession which began in the early 1990s, 
while the U.S. economy had done so a year earlier. We believe that benchmarking must take 
into account the cyclical behavior of economies. Thus, we find our benchmark more appro-
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priate than those employing discretionary “rounding” to years ending in zero or five.2 Our 
period of study can be divided into two phases (1994-2000 and 2001-07) each containing the 
same number of years, separated by the recession that followed the 2000 stock-market crash 
and lasted until 2002 or 2003, depending on the country. 
Our source of statistical information is the database of the Groningen Growth and De-
velopment Center (GGDC), used as an international benchmark in the majority of studies on 
productivity and employment. It provides basic data on GDP in two different constant units: 
1990 U.S. dollars, converted at purchasing power parity according to the Geary Khamis me-
thod (GK); and 2007 U.S. dollars, updating the 2005 data, also in PPP, obtained by the Èltetò-
Köves-Szulc method (EKS). However, the second series does not provide information on the 
former Federal Germany, thus disallowing EU aggregate data for periods prior to German 
unification.3 As growth rates are almost identical, we have used the data in 1990 U.S. dollars 
PPP-GK, to allow aggregation for the period of economic expansion (1950-73) and the fol-
lowing decades of slow growth (1974-93).4 These data are of interest in comparison with the 
reference period (1994-2007). 
The data on labor productivity growth in U.S and EU (Tables 1 and 2) highlight the fol-
lowing facts:  
                                                 
     2 However, these benchmarking criteria do not involve substantive change in respect to results obtained when 
observing “round” periods such as 1990-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005. 
3  In the case of Germany, the years 1991-93 are still calculated with data for West Germany, so that data 
from this period are uniform (avoiding the sudden leap to unification in 1991). 
     4 Overall, the interval from 1974 to 1993 was a period of slow economic growth, although it rose somewhat at 
certain stages, especially in the second half of the 1980s.     
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1) Productivity growth rates have fallen significantly from the 1970s, compared to the 1950-
73 period, both in the EU-15 and the U.S. In Europe, where the pace of growth during the 
“Golden Age” was much higher than in the U.S., the average annual rate was reduced by over 
50% in 1974-93. This lower pace of growth was further reduced (by another 35%) during 
1994-2007. Meanwhile, in the U.S, the average rate was likewise reduced by 50% in 1974-93, 
but showed some recovery in 1994-2007. 
2) The labor efficiency growth rate during 1994-2007 is slightly higher in the U.S (1.84%) 
than in the EU (1.59%). This difference implies that, over the fourteen-year period, U.S. pro-
ductivity grew by 29%, while the European grew by 24.7%. 
3) However, when this period is divided into two intervals split by the year 2000, two differ-
ent scenarios emerge. European productivity maintained a downward trend, passing from an 
average of 1.95% per annum (during 1994-2000) to 1.24% (2001-07), while the U.S. produc-
tivity rate rose from 1.67% to 2.02%. Consequently, the highest rate of growth in U.S. labor 
efficiency corresponded to the second interval (2001-07), while in 1994-2000 the European 
rate of increase was higher than in the U.S. (Table 1). 
4) Productivity slowdown has been widely verified among all European countries. Almost all 
EU economies recorded successive declines in 1950-73, in 1974-93, and in 1994-2007, as 
well as in both divided phases of the latter period.5 However, even in 2001-07, five countries 
(Finland, Sweden, the UK, Greece, and Ireland) maintained higher growth rates than the U.S. 
Other countries, notably Austria, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain, showed rates below 1%, 
while Italy’s productivity even failed to rise in the latest interval. 
                                                 
     5  Table 1 shows that the exceptions are few. Only Greece and Spain have higher rates in 2001-07 than in the 
previous interval, while the UK and Sweden maintain similar rates.      
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5) Therefore, the highest growth rates in U.S labor efficiency apply to the current decade but 
not to the 1990s, when the thesis of “the superiority of U.S. growth compared to Europe” was 
coined.6 This fact deserves attention for three reasons. First of all, 2001-07 was not a “bril-
liant” period for the American economy, as the second half of the 1990s had been. Secondly, 
U.S. productivity growth (at 2%) was not dramatic; its “superiority” was due mainly to the 
weakening of the European efficiency growth rate (at 1.2%). And thirdly, economic growth 
during the last phase was affected by many “outlier” factors: the 2001-02 recession, a sharp 
decline in employment, a rise in public spending alongside increasing fiscal imbalances, the 
huge foreign trade deficit, and the real estate bubble. All these elements are part of a very spe-
cific macroeconomic dynamic, but they are not much in line with what are generally consid-
ered to be drivers of productivity. 
6) Thanks to the aforementioned differences in the pace of productivity growth, the second 
half of the 20th century also saw a convergence between European and American productivity 
levels (Table 2). Large differences in 1950, when the EU-15 level amounted to only 42%, 
were progressively reduced, so that by 1995 the level stood at 88.5%. This was its peak, as the 
                                                 
     6 Many who defend this thesis (cited in note 15) take a selective benchmark from 1996 to 2000 -- when U.S. 
productivity recorded an average rate of 2.14% per year -- in order to better highlight the role of new technolo-
gies. Thus, they omit the previous years 1994 and 1995, when growth rates were 0.9% and 0.1%, which seems 
unreasonable since ICTs were already at work. Even so, U.S. productivity growth during 1996-2000 was similar 
to (not higher than) in the EU (2.18%). Other articles, such as by Van Ark and Smits (2008), take the period 
1996-2004 -- whose average rate was 2.35% -- to emphasize ICTs’ impact on productivity, but they omit 2005-
07, when growth rates were successively 1.4%, 0.9%, and 1.3%. Why would these supply drivers have lost their 
impact in more recent years? Remarkable also is the inclusion of productivity results during the recession of 
2001-02 -- when employment fell sharply -- but the exclusion of results after 2005. 
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subsequent slowdown in European growth reduced this difference to 86.6% in 2000, and to 
82% in 2007. 
7) Several European countries maintain higher productivity levels than the U.S. In 1994, Lux-
embourg, Belgium, and the Netherlands exceeded the U.S. level, France and Italy equaled it, 
and Germany was just slightly behind (Table 2). Midway through the period, in 2000, the first 
four countries and Austria were all above the U.S., while Germany and Italy were at U.S. lev-
els. However, the weakness of European production in recent years left only Luxembourg and 
Belgium above the U.S. level in 2007, while Austria, France, and Netherlands remained close, 
but lower. 
 
3. AGGREGATE DEMAND AND THE EMPLOYMENT-PRODUCTIVITY 
TRADE-OFF 
As we have developed in previous articles,7 in terms of the macroeconomic dynamic, 
economic growth is primarily determined by demand and income distribution.8 Thus, labor 
productivity growth is structurally conditioned by the evolution of aggregate demand. At the 
same time, there is always a trade-off effect between employment and productivity, which is 
particularly intense during periods of weak productivity growth. Obviously, this proposition 
allows further clarifications, and does not deny that other factors also influence productivity’s 
pace of growth, including wage response, distribution trends, or the sectoral structure of pro-
duction. 
 
     7 Palazuelos and Fernández (2009), and Fernández and Palazuelos (2009). 
     8 Also from this approach, we highlight Cornwall (1994), Cornwall and Cornwall (2002), Eatwell (1996), 
Marglin and Schor (1990), Setterfield and Cornwall (2002), Stockhammer (2004), Mitchell et al (2006), Lorentz 
and Savona (2006), and Naastepad (2006). 
Table 1. Labor productivity growth (average annual rates)  
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PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR (1990 US$ PPP-GK) 
1950-1973 2.57 4.69 5.83 5.91 4.75 3.81 5.92 4.71 5.11 6.41 4.47 5.55 4.36 3.63 6.53 2.85 4.09 
1974-1993 1.32 2.48 2.87 2.62 2.63 2.29 4.19 3.00 2.71 1.70 3.37 2.50 1.78 2.35 1.70 2.50 1.31 
1994-2007 1.84 1.59 1.78 2.46 1.35 1.50 0.45 2.54 1.74 2.29 3.71 0.90 1.53 1.58 1.94 2.22 2.36 
    1994-2000 1.67 1.95 2.22 4.06 1.78 1.95 0.05 2.81 2.26 1.47 4.66 1.77 1.94 1.97 3.00 2.18 2.41 
    2001-2007 2.02 1.24 1.33 0.89 0.93 1.05 0.85 2.28 1.22 3.11 2.76 0.04 1.11 1.19 0.89 2.25 2.31 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1990 US$ PPP-GK) 
1950-1973 3.93 4.83 5.99 5.35 4.08 3.81 6.60 4.94 5.05 6.98 3.20 5.64 4.76 3.30 5.73 2.93 3.73 
1974-1993 2.80 2.17 2.11 2.47 1.98 1.69 3.04 1.89 2.12 2.10 3.84 2.41 2.21 3.37 2.84 1.74 1.40 
1994-2007 3.09 2.41 1.62 2.34 2.33 2.48 3.55 3.81 2.22 3.66 7.26 1.58 2.83 4.65 2.36 2.97 3.16 
    1994-2000 3.87 2.83 2.08 2.75 2.73 3.26 3.66 4.48 2.62 3.05 8.95 2.07 3.76 5.12 3.66 3.33 3.52 
    2001-2007 2.32 1.99 1.17 1.94 1.94 1.70 3.43 3.14 1.81 4.28 5.60 1.09 1.92 4.18 1.07 2.61 2.80 
EMPLOYMENT (total hours worked by persons engaged) 
1950-1973 1.33 0.06 0.15 -0.53 -0.63 0.00 0.64 0.23 -0.06 0.53 -1.22 -0.09 0.38 -0.32 -0.76 0.08 -0.35 
1974-1993 1.46 -0.47 -0.74 -0.14 -0.63 -0.58 -1.10 -1.07 -0.57 0.40 0.45 -0.08 0.42 1.00 1.12 -0.74 0.09 
1994-2007 1.23 0.80 -0.15 -0.12 0.97 0.97 3.08 1.23 0.47 1.35 3.43 0.67 1.29 3.02 0.41 0.74 0.78 
    1994-2000 2.17 0.86 -0.13 -1.25 0.94 1.28 3.61 1.62 0.35 1.56 4.10 0.30 1.78 3.09 0.64 1.13 1.08 
    2001-2007 0.29 0.75 -0.16 1.03 0.99 0.65 2.56 0.85 0.59 1.14 2.77 1.04 0.79 2.95 0.18 0.35 0.48 
Hours per person engaged 
1950-1973 -0.27 -0.66 -1.03 -0.46 -1.13 -0.89 0.15 -0.27 -0.44 -0.41 -0.64 -0.72 -1.00 -1.13 -0.64 -0.41 -0.89 
1974-1993 -0.23 -0.59 -1.07 -0.67 -0.70 -0.66 -0.78 -0.43 -0.92 -0.36 -0.06 -0.57 -1.03 -0.53 -0.33 -0.76 -0.14 
1994-2007 -0.10 -0.29 -0.56 -0.61 0.05 0.18 -0.47 -0.19 -0.49 -0.04 -0.71 -0.21 -0.23 -0.49 -0.37 -0.15 0.08 
    1994-2000 0.42 -0.30 -0.72 -1.40 -0.02 0.21 0.34 -0.05 -0.79 0.15 -0.85 -0.13 -0.45 -0.57 -0.67 0.06 0.40 
    2001-2007 -0.61 -0.27 -0.39 0.18 0.11 0.15 -1.28 -0.33 -0.19 -0.24 -0.47 -0.29 -0.01 -0.41 -0.08 -0.35 -0.23 
Number of persons engaged 
1950-1973 1.60 0.66 1.19 -0.07 0.50 0.89 0.48 0.49 0.38 0.95 -0.58 0.81 1.39 0.82 -0.12 0.49 0.55 
1974-1993 1.70 0.31 0.34 0.53 0.07 0.07 -0.32 -0.64 0.35 0.76 0.52 0.49 1.47 1.53 1.46 0.03 0.23 
1994-2007 1.33 1.11 0.41 0.50 0.92 0.78 3.57 1.42 0.97 1.39 4.17 0.88 1.52 3.53 0.79 0.88 0.70 
    1994-2000 1.75 1.15 0.9 0.14 0.95 1.07 3.26 1.67 1.15 1.41 5.10 0.43 2.24 3.68 1.32 1.07 0.68 
    2001-2007 0.91 1.07 0.23 0.85 0.88 0.50 3.89 1.18 0.78 1.37 3.25 1.34 0.80 3.37 0.26 0.70 0.72 
* In order to guarantee the coherence of the data prior to and after reunification in 1990, the series of the period 1974-93 has been created from 1991 by applying the variation rates of the unified country 
to the FDR data.  
Source: Drawn up from Annual-Macroeconomic Database (AMECO) and Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC) Database 
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Table 2. Labor productivity and hours worked by persons engaged in European economies: relative levels (USA = 100)  
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PRODUCTIVITY PER HOUR (constant PPP US$ 2007, EKS) 
1950 41.8 43.2 33.9 52.1 57.1 24.8 33.9 43.2 26.5 31.3 40.0 63.9 91.0 18.8 62.9 58.4 
1973 65.2 74.6 70.9 84.4 75.2 51.9 54.5 75.7 61.6 47.7 77.2 95.1 115.3 44.8 67.0 81.9 
1993 84.9 95.1 91.5 109.2 91.0 90.7 75.7 99.6 66.4 71.2 97.3 104.2 141.3 48.4 84.4 81.8 
2000 86.6 98.8 107.7 110.0 92.8 81.1 81.9 103.7 65.5 87.3 98.0 106.2 144.2 53.0 87.4 86.1 
2007 82.1 94.3 99.7 102.1 86.8 74.8 83.3 98.1 70.6 91.8 85.5 99.8 136.3 49.0 88.9 87.8 
HOURS WORKED BY PERSON ENGAGED 
1950 111.1 118.2 104.6 119.7 106.8 102.2 101.4 111.4 115.7 120.7 107.9 114.5 124.3 114.0 100.4 105.2 
1973 102.2 99.1 100.1 98.1 92.6 112.6 101.4 107.2 111.9 110.8 97.3 96.6 101.8 104.8 87.0 101.7 
1993 94.6 86.0 91.7 89.4 85.0 100.7 97.4 93.3 109.0 114.6 90.9 82.2 95.9 102.7 88.6 91.4 
2000 89.9 79.4 80.7 86.7 83.8 100.2 94.3 85.8 107.0 104.2 87.4 77.4 89.5 95.2 88.5 89.1 
2007 92.2 80.7 85.3 91.2 88.4 95.6 96.2 88.4 109.9 105.2 89.5 80.7 90.8 98.8 90.9 90.8 
Source: Drawn up from Groningen Growth and Development Centre. Total Economy Database.  
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The central argument raised by this theoretical proposition is the following: to the extent 
that economies are usually below full employment of labor and capital resources, aggregate 
demand determines the actual output growth rate and, consequently, the productivity and em-
ployment rates as well. Therefore, macroeconomic dynamics determine labor productivity’s 
pace of growth. At the same time, however, this link is affected by factors that either promote 
or hinder job creation. Thus, given a certain (expansive or contractive) movement of aggre-
gate demand, the higher (lower) employment growth results in lower (higher) productivity 
growth. 
The structural determination of labor efficiency by aggregate demand is brought about 
through three processes: a) a scale effect, so that market expansion favors the increased use of 
installed capital facilities, thus reducing the capital-output ratio (K/Y); b) a capitalization ef-
fect, causing an increase in nonresidential investment (especially equipment), which raises the 
capital-labor ratio (K/L); and c) a technological effect, which is produced through investments 
in equipment that improves technologies, leading to an increase in the capital-labor ratio and a 
declining capital-output ratio. Each of these effects drives productivity growth9. 
Examining first the relationship between aggregate demand and productivity growth, it 
is noted that the sharp increase in demand during 1960-7310 (the phase of fastest growth in the 
Golden Age, when average annual rates reached 5.8% for the EU and 4.5% for the U.S.) was 
followed by productivity increases of 4.7% and 2.6%, respectively. Since then, from 1974 to 
                                                 
9 The productivity level (Y/L) can be expressed as Y/L ≡ (K/L)/(K/Y), being K the capital stock and L the em-
ployment. Thus, the labor productivity growth rate (q) equals the difference between the rates of growth of both 
ratios: capital–labor (k) and capital–output (s). 
     10  Aggregate demand includes consumption (government and household) and investment (private and public) 
plus exports. The calculations are made from the Annual Macroeconomic Database (AMECO), published by the 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the European Commission (DGEF), whose data series 
began in 1960. 
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2007, significantly lower increases in aggregate demand (2.9% and 3.2%) have led to more 
moderate growth rates in productivity (2.2% and 1.5%). Figure 1 shows the evolution of both 
variables for the United States during 1961-2007, using moving averages of five years.11 
 
 
Figure 1. Aggregate Demand and Labor Productivity in USA, 1961-2007: average annual rates, five 
years moving averages 
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
4,0
4,5
5,0
5,5
6,0
6,5
19
61
19
63
19
65
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
Productivity per hour
Aggregate Demand
 
Source: Drawn up from AMECO and GGDC 
 
At the same time, these data show that there is no strict proportionality between both 
variables. The difference between European and American growth productivity rates during 
1960-73 are significantly higher than that of aggregate demand, because the EU failed to cre-
ate employment (total hours worked), while employment in the U.S. grew at 1.3% per annum 
(Table 1). Again, demand growth rates were similar (2.5% vs 2.9%) during next period (1974-
                                                 
    11 AMECO does not allow calculate aggregate demand annual data for the whole EU-15 until the 1990s; none-
theless, several of the major European countries have development profiles similar to those shown in the figure. 
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93) but the weakening of productivity growth as compared to the previous period was differ-
ent (2.5% vs. 1.3%), since the EU suffered a severe fall in employment while the U.S. contin-
ued to create employment (-0.5% vs. 1.5%). 
The trade-off between employment and productivity becomes even more evident during 
1994-2007. Here aggregate demand in the EU showed some recovery, but productivity 
growth slowed, since the EU became a net job creator, at a significant rate (0.8%), breaking 
its record of four decades earlier. On the other side, U.S. demand also increased somewhat, 
with higher productivity growth rates due to less intense employment growth. 
Thus, the employment path followed by the EU during the second half of the 20th cen-
tury began to change in the 1990s, when many countries implemented policies that have since 
continued.12 Simultaneously, there has been in the current decade a shift in the American 
growth style, toward less intense employment growth. From this criss-cross, two different 
scenarios have emerged: 
• The European Union raised the aggregate demand growth rate in 1994-2000 (4% per 
year), but reduced its productivity growth rate (1.95%) alongside a significant increase in 
employment (0.86%). Later, in 2001-07, the EU slowed the aggregate demand growth dy-
namic (2.65%) as well as productivity (1.24%), because employment growth remained 
similar to the previous period (0.75%). Thus, the turnaround toward employment began in 
the 1990s has been consolidated, despite the fact that economic growth is significantly 
lower. 
• U.S. aggregate demand growth in 1994-2000 was even higher than that of the EU 
(4.65%), but its productivity growth rate was slightly lower (1.8%) as job creation grew 
                                                 
     12 Artus and Cette (2004) contains an appendix (pp 217, ff) with major reforms by the European countries to 
create jobs. 
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very intensely (2.2%). In contrast, the notable slowdown during 2001-07 in aggregate de-
mand (2.63%) was consistent with higher productivity growth (2%), since employment 
growth was severely reduced, with an annual average rate of 0.3%, unusually low com-
pared to past five decades. 
Therefore we have a paradox: the EU-15 records its worst productivity results just when 
it manages to imitate the job creation that has always characterized the U.S. economy. At the 
same time, the U.S lags behind its traditional capacity to generate net employment, at the 
same time getting better productivity results. A satisfactory interpretation of this paradox is 
possible when seen through the macroeconomic dynamic, and the drivers which create em-
ployment, as we later demonstrate. 
Figure 2 summarizes the evolution of aggregate demand and productivity of the fifteen 
European countries in the two aforementioned intervals of the overall period 1994-2007. Al-
most all follow the “EU pattern” characterized by declining growth rates in demand and pro-
ductivity, plus remarkable job creation. From one phase to the next, each country’s position 
on the graph moves to the left and down.13 In Sweden and the UK, the slowdown in demand 
does not affect productivity growth as they reduce their pace of employment growth. Thus, 
these are the only two European countries that follow a trend similar to that of the United 
States, which is also included in the graph. 
 
 
 
                                                 
     13  Greece and Spain show a different trend, as demand slowdown is soft, productivity growth rises (sharply 
in Greece and slightly in Spain), and job creation continue to grow. These particular performances require the 
explanation of additional factors, which would lead beyond the purpose of this work. 
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Figure 2. Aggregate Demand and Labor Productivity growth in 1994-2000 (1) and 2001-07 
(2) 
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Ireland and Luxemburg are out of the figure, because they have much higher growth rates. Ireland: 1994-2000 (12.4% y 
4.7%) and 2001-07 (5.2% y 2.8%). Luxemburg: 1994-2000 (7.4% y 2.0%) and 2001-07 (5.4% and 1.2%).  
Source: Drawn up from GGCD and AMECO. 
 
 
4. EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY SHARES IN ECONOMIC GROWTH: 
A BACK AND FORTH DEBATE? 
Although there has long been discussion over why European countries saw larger in-
creases in labor productivity than the U.S., in the early 1990s that debate began to focus on 
differences in labor performance. Regular reports by the OECD reflected the focus: Europe 
showed greater productivity increases because it had serious problems increasing employ-
ment. Consequently, most of the work inspired by this approach has sought to establish the 
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reasons for, and the effects of, lower employment rates in the European economies, due as 
much to lower activity rates as to higher unemployment rates.14 
Thus, the academic and political debates have taken, as their common belief, the notion 
that rigidity in European labor markets (in contrast to flexible U.S. markets) limits Europe’s 
ability to incorporate more people into economic production. Some authors (such as Prescott, 
2004) indicate that the main obstacle is the tax burden on employment, while others (Alesina 
et al, 2006) move this responsibility to demands by trade unions (higher wages and fewer 
work hours), as well as other political pressures that retract recruitment and tend to limit the 
number of working hours. Widening the range of causes, other authors (Ljungqvist and Sar-
gent, 2006) point to the welfare state in European countries, where unemployment and other 
social transfers incentivize higher unemployment and inactivity. Another view is presented by 
Blanchard (2004), who argues that European citizens show a greater willingness toward lei-
sure, which: slows the incorporation of young people to labor markets; reduces working hours 
per week; anticipates retirement age; increases the number of public holidays; and extends 
summer vacation. Blanchard’s point is that this preference for leisure is only partly voluntary, 
as it is also largely influenced by labor market inefficiencies. 
The corollary to all these approaches is that EU should create the institutional condi-
tions to push the inactive and unemployed into the labor market. By doing so, the productivity 
gap between Europe and the U.S. would be considerably reduced. 
In several recent papers, Robert Gordon has attempted to propose yet another reading. 
On the one hand, he identifies those major differences that drive Europe’s proportionally low-
er employment, compared to the U.S. He estimates that two thirds of that differential can be 
                                                 
     14 Representative works on this thesis: Layard et al (1991), Nickell and Layard (1998), Prescott (2004), Ale-
sina and Giavazzi (2006), Baily and Kirkegaard (2004), Bassanini et al (2001), Blanchard (2001) and Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000). 
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explained by the lower activity rate, and the other third by the higher unemployment rate, 
which is higher across all ages but especially among the young (19 to 24) and those older than 
55 (Gordon, 2008).15 Next he insists that there is no single cause but a multiplicity of reasons 
behind EU-U.S. differences, emphasizing the diversity of labor situations within the European 
Union (Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2006, 2008). Moreover, Dew-Becker and Gordon (2008) 
examine the mechanisms of the trade-off between employment and productivity through a 
variety of elements related to employment taxes, employee protection, benefits to the unem-
ployed, labor regulations, degree of unionization, and a dummy variable related to high-
degree corporatism. 
However, not even these more nuanced approaches escape considering U.S. labor mar-
kets as a (favorable) bench mark. Little do they bear in mind that the number of hours worked 
has hardly declined for decades, or that hours worked by employee in manufacturing contin-
ues to grow, and already exceed 41 hours per week (1980: 39.7, 1990: 40.5, 2007: 41.2), ac-
cording to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). The same goes for the weak 
“broad guidelines” established by the Fair Labor Standards Act, which give rise to a precari-
ous legal protection of the workers. Nor is it much considered that, according to the BLS, 
more than a fifth of private sector employees are not compensated for holidays or vacations, 
so that the percentage of workers with a week or less vacation per year keeps growing. Simi-
larly, the U.S. minimum wage in 2005 (in constant dollars of that year) was one third below 
that of 1962, while the hourly earnings of employees in 2006 remained nearly 10% below that 
of thirty years prior.  
                                                 
     15 The employment/population ratio (L/P) is divided into two ratios: employment rate and activity rate, so that 
(L/P)=(L/AP)*(PA/P). Since PA = L-U (unemployment), then the first term becomes [1-(U/PA)], so (L/P)= 
[1-(U/PA)]*(PA/P). 
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Should these data be ignored? Given the low levels of U.S. unemployment protection, 
or the weakness of most of public coverage, should the U.S. labor market serve as good refer-
ence for reforming Europe’s (heterogeneous) labor markets? Does it make sense, in the 21st 
century, with societies richer and technological capability increasing, that a rising number of 
hours worked per employee be exalted as positive, or that countries reducing hours be viewed 
as negative?16 It is difficult, but necessary, to separate topics such as these from others where 
American society is clearly advantageous, such as in the increased activity rates of women 
and youth, or the greater social value placed on personal effort. 
Beyond certain technical features, these are issues with profound social and political 
implications for developed economies. Criticism of the negative role exerted by any policies 
that “remove competitive tension in the labor market” may well serve to legitimate a conser-
vative vision, but is not an objective argument, or a proper basis of reference for evaluating 
the (negative) conditions of the institutional framework of European labor markets. Without 
ignoring the obvious problems that exist in these varied markets, many authors have ques-
tioned the fundamentals underlying the comparison with the United States.17 Eventually, the 
OECD itself (in 2004) admitted that there was no obvious relationship between the evolution 
of employment and unemployment in respect to employment-protection legislation. 
However, in view of recent events, this debate has begun to take a different perspective. 
With respect to the two components into which employment growth can be split: changes in 
                                                 
     16 Hours worked per employed person are on average 8% less in the EU-15 than in the U.S. Despite the fact 
that during the current decade the U.S. has reduced its ratio by 4% (1,855 hours in 2000, and 1,777 in 2007), 
while most European countries have increased the ratio somewhat, only Greece and Ireland show rates above the 
U.S., while in Germany (at 1,433 hours), Austria (1,515), and Netherlands (1,434), levels are between 15% and 
20% below the U.S. 
     17 See, for instance, Howell (2004, 2006), Groot et al (2004), Mitchell et al (2006), Welters and Muysken 
(2002), Freeman (2008), Stockhammer (2004), and Buchele and Christiansen (1999). 
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the occupation rate and changes in the number of hours worked by person engaged (Table 1), 
significant changes in the respective trends in both Europe and the U.S. have been observed. 
In the interval 2001-07, when U.S. productivity growth exceeded that of the European 
Union, the U.S. slowed the rate of demand for new jobs (to 0.9%) and considerably the num-
ber of hours worked (-0.6%), increasing employment in total hours worked by just 0.3% an-
nually. These are radically different features than those which characterized American labor 
performance during the second half of the 20th century.18  
Meanwhile, Europe has moved into a very different scenario. The slowdown in produc-
tivity growth continues its process of convergence toward the “American labor model” (Co-
hen and Pisani-Ferry, 2008). The employment level is growing at an annual rate of 1.1%, and 
the decrease in the number of hours by person engaged is very slight (-0.3% per year), so that 
total employment has increased at a rate of 0.75% per annum. 
Thus, almost all European countries have raised their activity and employment rates 
since 1994,19 incorporating new ranges of inactive and unemployed persons into labor mar-
kets, while the (higher) U.S. rates have hardly changed, despite that nation’s faster pace of 
GDP growth. 
In light of these facts, it remains to be seen whether the debate on the relationship be-
tween the functioning of labor markets, job creation, and productivity performance is eventu-
ally reversed, now that superior U.S. labor efficiency is based on the growth-style previously 
at work in European countries. Should these productivity rates be detracted, and/or call into 
                                                 
     18  The contrast is clear: the employment growth rate in 1994-2000 was 1.75%, while hours worked per em-
ployed person increased at 0.4%, so that the employment growth rate was 2.2%. 
     19  The activity rate in the EU rose rapidly in 1994-2007, from 67.1% to 72.2%. It was considerably  higher in 
Denmark (80%), Sweden (79%), and the Netherlands (85.5%), while in Germany, Austria, Finland, and the 
United Kingdom it stood around 75-76%. Source: Eurostat. 
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question the accepted benefits of the U.S. labor market, due to its limited capacity to create 
jobs? Or is it wiser to escape such simplistic approaches, and to adopt a more complex per-
spective on the determinants of productivity growth and their relation to job creation from a 
macroeconomic perspective? 
 
5.  NEW TECHNOLOGIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND PRODUCTIVITY  
The argument that U.S. productivity growth has, since the 1990s, been higher than that 
of Europe is generally explained by the outstanding role played by ICTs:20 the production of 
goods and services related to computers, components, software and communications equip-
ment, along with a diffusion through those branches of economy using such technologies, has 
indeed driven a sharp increase in productivity. The virtues of ICTs are wider still since they 
contribute to the better functioning of markets, to price stability (via continuous drops in the 
production costs of ICT), to the internationalization of production (with a subsequent rise in 
competitiveness), and to improving human capital.21 Greater development of ICT in the Unit-
ed States explains the “acceleration” of productivity growth, and its gap with EU countries.  
However, we must reiterate that the U.S. productivity growth rate during 1994-2000 
(1.67%), although has improved over the 1974-93 period (1.32%), cannot be regarded as an 
                                                 
     20 It should be remembered that, before they began to emphasize the role of ICTs, many academic works 
during theearly 1990s showed skepticism over accepted methods of measuring productivity. Such accounting 
techniques were not able to precisely reflect labor efficiency growth. However, when such data (with the same 
methods) began to show better performance after 1996, that skepticism was soon forgotten. 
     21 Representative works on this thesis are: Jorgenson (2001), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), Jorgenson, Ho and 
Stiroh (2000, 2005), Oliner and Sichel (2000, 2002), McGuckin, Spiegelman and Van Ark (2005), Van Ark and 
Smits (2008), Timmer and Van Ark (2005), Van Ark, Inklaar and McGuckin (2003), Van Ark and Inklaar 
(2005), and Stiroh (2002 a y b).  
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“acceleration” and in any case proved lower than that seen in the EU-15 (1.95%) for the same 
period. It was later, in the 2001-07 phase, when U.S. productivity grew at a higher rate 
(2.02%) than in the previous interval and than in the EU (1.24%), where it continued to slow. 
Without a doubt, investments in ICT have been significantly higher in the U.S. than in 
Europe, but the empirical evidence also reveals that the relationship between ITC and produc-
tivity growth is not linear. According to the Total Economy Growth Accounting Database 
(GGDC), during the period 1994-2004, gross fixed capital formation grew at an average an-
nual rate of 5.2% in the U.S. and at 2.7% in the EU. At the same time, computer equipment, 
software, and telecommunications equipment accounted for 27% of fixed investment in the 
U.S., compared to 15% in Europe.22 Consequently, investment in ICT gradually increased its 
presence in U.S. total investment, from 15% in 1993 to 30% in 2000, and to 37% in 2004, 
while in the European Union it rose, respectively, from 8% to 17% and to 20%.23 
The behavior of capital-labor and capital-output ratios (Table 3) shows how investment 
and employment conditions influence productivity performance. Higher investment growth in 
the U.S. (compared to the EU, 1994-2004) implies a further increase in U.S. productivity, 
over that of Europe. That productivity growth gap is explained through the evolution of capi-
tal-labor and capital-output ratios, and it confirms the importance of distinguishing two sepa-
rate time intervals. 
 
 
                                                 
     22  The largest differences are seen in the growth of investment in telecommunications equipment (9.6% an-
nually in the U.S. and 5.9% in the EU) and software (10.7% vs 8%). 
     23 Obviously, these differences influence the evolution and composition of gross fixed capital stock. The 
capital stock growth rate from 1994 to 2004 was 2.8% annually in the U.S. and 2.3% in the EU. 
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Table 3. Capital Stock, and Capital-Labor and Capital-Output ratios, 1994-2004. 
 (average annual growth rates in each interval). 
1994-2004 1994-2000 2001-2004  
USA EU USA EU USA EU 
Fixed Capital Stock 2.84 2.37 2.98 2.28 2.58 2.25 
Employment (hours) 1.20 0.66 2.17 0.86 -0.48 0.31 
Capital-Labor 1.62 1.60 0.79 1.41 3.08 1.93 
Capital-Output -0.38 -0.13 -0.86 -0.53 0.46 0.58 
Labor productivity 2.01 1.73 1.67 1.95 2.62 1.36 
Source: Drawn up from GGDC. Total Economy Growth Accounting Database.- 
 
• Between 1994 and 2000, despite the fact that the capital-output (K/Y) ratio declined more 
in the U.S., European productivity growth saw a higher rate, due to a larger increase in the 
capital-labor ratio (K/L). However, this larger increase in the K/L ratio did not derive 
from a greater capitalization rate. In fact the opposite is true: U.S. capital stock grew fast-
er, but so did employment, so that the K/L ratio grew at an average rate of 0.8% annually, 
while in Europe it grew at 1.4%. Thus, the capital-labor ratio grew faster in Europe, be-
cause employment growth was lower. 
• Between 2001 and 2004 (and thus including the years of economic recession), the U.S. 
productivity growth rate was almost twice that of the EU. As the K/Y ratio grew in both 
cases, and at similar rates, the differentiating factor is found in the behavior of the capital-
labor ratio. This time, with similar increases in capital stock, this ratio grew faster in U.S. 
than in Europe because.employment fell in America, while it continued to grow in Eu-
rope. 
Thus, investment --especially in new technologies-- is key to explaining the dynamics 
followed by productivity. First, as a component of aggregate demand, increasing investment 
contributes to market expansion, so that the scale effect reduces the capital-output ratio, as 
found in the 1994-2000 phase of higher economic growth. Secondly, investment determines 
the growth of capital stock, so that the capitalization effect raises the capital-labor ratio. 
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Thirdly, investment in ICT and other technological innovations increases labor efficiency, 
either by increasing the K/L or decreasing the K/Y. 
However, this causal relationship is not closed to other factors, which are also part of 
the economic dynamic that influences productivity growth. The employment trends analyzed 
in this article are among those factors, as becomes clearer when the sectoral and branch struc-
ture of the U.S. economy is studied. 
During the second half of the 1990s, when the U.S. recorded its greatest growth rate in 
labor efficiency, production activities directly linked to ICT saw dramatic productivity gains, 
such as manufacturing of computers and other office equipment, with an average rate of 35% 
per annum, or of electronic components and accessories (at 29%), or communication equip-
ment (at 17.5%).24 However, employment in these branches recorded annual growth rates of 
only 1%-3%.  
Other areas of high productivity, such as automotive and aerospace, saw similar em-
ployment growth, whereas many other branches of equipment production lost employment, as 
did production of industrial electrical equipment, appliances, professional equipment, and 
most machinery (engines and turbines, metalworking machines, agricultural, and both general 
and specialized industrial machinery). Apart from these equipment industries, chemicals and 
petrochemicals, the other major manufacturing branch, presented the same profile: significant 
productivity growth rates together with employment decline both in organic and inorganic 
chemicals, plastics and rubber. 
This scenario became even more intense after the economic recession of 2001-02. The 
bulk of industries, especially those with a higher technological content, increased their pro-
ductivity while reducing employment. Thus, between 1994 and 2007, the productivity of the 
                                                 
     24  Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Releases, Productivity and Costs. 
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whole manufacturing sector grew at an average rate of 4.1% but lost employment at a rate of -
1.4% per year. 
Moreover, it must be considered that the manufacturing sector represents a shrinking 
proportion of both GDP and employment (13.8% and 10.5%, respectively, in 2007), so that its 
productivity dynamic is not representative of the economy as a whole. The overwhelming 
presence of service activities (78% of GDP and 82% of employment) means that services is 
now the most determinant sector in observing the behavior of the aggregate economy.25 With-
in the service sector, there is a marked duality between: 
• A minority group of activities related to finance, communications, and certain areas of 
commercial and business service, whose performance resembles that of manufactur-
ing: high capitalization, greater use of new technologies, low job creation, and more 
highly skilled work. In these activities, the capital-output ratio is reduced while capi-
tal-labor ratio increases, leading to dynamic growth in labor productivity. 
• A rather larger set of activities are those characterized by low capital endowment, 
lower diffusion of new technologies, high labor intensity, low-skilled jobs, and low 
value added. In these activities, the capital-labor ratio increases slowly and the capital-
output ratio is reduced only slightly, or even rises, so that labor productivity either in-
creases weakly or remains stagnant. Here are found the majority of activities related to 
welfare, education, health, public administration, leisure, and other personal services, 
as well as some business services and commercial networks.26 
                                                 
      25 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Terciarisation is lower in the EU, at around 71% of GDP. Source: 
Eurostat. 
     26 Education, healthcare, hotels and restaurants, leisure, and other personal services account for about 11% of 
GDP and over 23% of employment. If public administration (mainly services) is added, these branches represent 
22% of GDP and 40% of employment. 
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The features that characterize many service activities limit the influence of expanding 
demand on productivity.27 A great many services take place in small establishments that op-
erate with very tight capacity, so that the scale effect has limited room for expansion. Weak 
capital endowment means that the capitalization effect cannot be sufficiently expansive. The 
incorporation of technological progress depends on the potential of these facilities to incorpo-
rate capital goods and skilled labor, to raise the capital-labor ratio and lower the capital-output 
ratio. Most of these activities are not internationalized, and therefore are not affected by for-
eign demand, cannot be relocated, and do not face global competition.28 
 
5.  CONCLUSION  
From the viewpoint of labor efficiency, European economies are in a worrisome situa-
tion. The pace of productivity growth has fallen from period to period since the 1970s, so that 
the most recent phase (2001-07) showed an annual average growth rate of only 1.2%. This 
slowdown is repeated in almost all EU-15 countries, and only five had an average productiv-
ity growth rate above 2% per year. 
At the same time, the thesis that U.S. productivity is still growing at an accelerating rate 
is not supported by the data, and neither has the U.S. rate been significantly above the Euro-
pean since the later 1990s. Such theses, widely extended trough academic, professional, and 
political fields, argue that the U.S. productivity dynamic is superior to Europe’s thanks to two 
                                                 
     27 Fernández and Palazuelos (2009), Artus (2004), Cahuc and Debonneuil (2004), Kin (2007), Lorenz and 
Savona (2006), Sasaki (2007), and Savona-Lorenz (2006). 
     28 Services place poorly in foreign trade, as exports and imports represent under 4% and 3% of GDP, respec-
tively, while service production nears 78% of GDP. 
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main factors: America’s greater ability to generate and disseminate ICT, and the better func-
tioning of its labor market. 
First, empirical evidence reveals that the pace of U.S. productivity growth during 1994-
2000 reached 1.7% annually. This is a rate slightly higher than recorded during the 1974-93 
period, but can in no way be described as an “acceleration” in the speed of growth. Only 
when benchmarking is discretionally manipulated (by leaving out 1994 and 1995, when pro-
ductivity grew below 1%, despite good economic growth) does the average rate rise beyond 
2% during 1996-2000. 
Second, empirical evidence denies that U.S. productivity growth over the period was 
above that of the European Union. During the first phase, 1994-2000, the average EU was 
1.95% per year, or 15% higher than in the U.S. Even when the range is limited to 1996-2000, 
the European growth rate (2.18%) was similar to that of the U.S. (2.14%). 
Third, the data reveal that during the second phase (2001-07), U.S. productivity growth 
was above that of the EU, because the U.S. economy slightly increased its rate while the EU 
continued on a downward trend. 
Such differing performances cannot simply be explained by “American superiority”, 
since productivity results have been significantly influenced by changes in employment 
trends. In 2001-07, U.S. employment grew slowly, deepening its tendency to reduce the aver-
age number of hours worked per employed person, while at the same time slowing its pace of 
job creation.  
Simultaneously, in 2001-07, precisely the opposite occurred in the EU-15, as most EU 
economies worked to consolidate a trend begun in the previous period, focusing much more 
than in past decades on job creation by braking the continuous decline in hours worked per 
person and by raising both its occupation and activity rates.  
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These facts force a new interpretation of the fabled influence of ICT and labor markets 
over the pace of productivity growth. Macroeconomic analysis provides a broader and more 
consistent explanation for economic growth and productivity performance. From a macrody-
namic viewpoint, the slowdown in aggregate demand since the 1970s has been the first de-
terminant of the lower productivity growth rate, when compared to 1950-73. Within this de-
mand dynamic, differences in framework between the U.S. and EU economies are clearly due 
to trade-off effects between employment and productivity. 
This trade-off effect provides a satisfactory interpretation for the influence of new tech-
nologies on productivity. Such technologies are incorporated into productive activities 
through ICT investment, but their influence on productivity is mediated through conditions of 
employment. In 1994-2000, the higher U.S. investment in ICTs  (versus the EU) resulted in 
faster growth of capital stock and a greater decline in the capital-output ratio; however, the 
American capital-labor ratio increased less than the European, due to the high U.S. rate of job 
creation. As a result, labor productivity increased more in the EU than in U.S. Later, in the 
interval 2001-04, these trends changed. The United States maintained a higher investment rate 
while its capital-output ratio (now rising) grew less than in the EU, while the capital-labor 
ratio registered an even greater difference: it recorded sharp growth in U.S., due to the fact 
that employment was now decreasing, while it continued to grow in the EU, so that the capi-
tal-labor ratio increased at a slower pace. Therefore, U.S. productivity growth was, in the end, 
considerably higher than that of the EU. 
Finally, asymmetries between sectors and branches within the service sector contribute 
to an explanation of why, if employment grows strongly during very dynamic periods in ag-
gregate demand (such as 1994-2000), productivity cannot grow much faster, despite an im-
proving growth rate. However, when demand dynamism is lower (as in 2001-07), productiv-
ity growth can be even higher, if such lower-demand growth leads to slower progress in job 
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creation. This has not occurred in most EU economies, which have chosen since the 1990s to 
implement employment policies highly focused toward the service sector, which in return 
become obstacles to productivity growth, especially when aggregate demand is less dynamic 
than that of U.S. 
From the perspective of the European countries, the ultimate conclusion of this analysis 
is that a “productivity problem” does in fact exist, due to a previous “demand problem” (a 
problem of consumption and, especially, of “investment”, related to salary constraints and the 
need to expand and modernize production structures). While such problems remain unsolved, 
European economies will not be able to generate greater demand growth, and any policy fo-
cused toward increasing job creation will result in low productivity growth. 
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